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EXPANSION OF TENANTS'
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN ILLINOIS:
GLASOE v. TRINKLE AND THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Landlords' and tenants' expectations regarding their rights and du-
ties in a residential lease have changed dramatically in the last twenty
years.1 The notion that a lease conveys a package of goods and services
encompassing not only the dwelling itself, but also heat, light, plumb-
ing, and other modem necessities,2 has replaced the feudal concept
under which a lease merely gave the tenant a right to possess the land.'
The result is that courts are conditioning a tenant's duty to pay rent on
a landlord's fulfillment of his implied duty to supply habitable prem-
ises.4 The response of many state legislatures to this common law de-
1. This shift in attitudes has been gradual since agrarian economy days. Many aca-
demic commentators in the 1960s and 1970s advocated judicial or legislative revision of
a landlord's obligation toward rental housing. See generally Quinn & Phillips, The Law
of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969-70) (discusses agrarian landlord-tenant law and current
developments, and makes suggestions to alleviate problems). For a very generalized
view of the development of the common law in this area, see Annotation, 40 A.L.R.3D
646 (1971 & Supp. 1984).
2. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Accord Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 225, 412 A.2d
436, 442 (1980).
3. The lease was regarded as a land conveyance with the landlord merely giving the
tenant a right to possession. See, ag., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass.
184, 189, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074. Because the lease
transaction's essential component was the land, the tenant's rental obligations continued
even if the dwelling burned or was otherwise destroyed. The rental obligation ceased
only when the landlord repossessed the property or substantially interfered with the
tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises. See generally Lesar, The Reform of Real
Property Law-Symposium: Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279(1960); Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants'Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of
Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971).
4. Courts generally state that this "implied warranty of habitability" means the
landlord impliedly represents that facilities vital to the dwelling's use as a residence are
free from latent defects and that the premises will remain safe, sanitary, and habitable
throughout the lease term. See, e.g., Kline v. Burns, I ll N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248,
252 (1971). For a descriptive analysis of the implied warranty of habitability, see Eaton,
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velopment is the enactment of housing and building codes5 establishing
minimum standards of habitability. 6 In Glasoe v. Trinkle7 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the implied warranty of habitability applies to
leases of residential property in areas with or without housing or build-
ing codes.8
Glasoe, a landlord, brought an action against his former tenants, the
Trinkles, for back rent.9 The tenants raised an affirmative defense of
breach of the implied warranty of habitability.10 They alleged that the
landlord had breached the warranty because defects and substandard
conditions made the premises unsafe, unhealthful, and unfit for occu-
pancy. 1 The trial court dismissed the affirmative defense for failure to
The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Illinois: Prairie State Lags Behind Other In-
dustrial States in Landlord-Tenant Law, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 183, 183-86 (1979-80).
Not every state has adopted the implied warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Cappaert
v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982) (lessee takes premises as he finds them, without
implied covenant of fitness; lessor is not obligated to make repairs); Blackwell v. Del
Bosco, 191 Colo. 344, 558 P.2d 563 (1976) (en bane) (no implied warranty for residen-
tial premises in landlord-tenant relationship).
5. Although courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably, "building code" and
"housing code" are not identical. Building codes protect against faulty design and con-
struction, while housing codes set out minimum living standards in already existing and
new residential structures. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, BUILDING CODES: A PROGRAM FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM A-28 at
11-12 (Jan. 1966). See also D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CONTROL LAW § 152 (1971) (building codes apply to new construction, while
housing codes regulate existing housing and conditions of occupancy).
A typical housing code is found in N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13A-1 to 13A-28 (West
Supp. 1985).
6. Courts and legislatures in at least 40 state jurisdictions and the District of Co-
lumbia have judicially adopted or legislatively enacted the implied warranty of habita-
bility. Mallor, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the "Non-Merchant"
Landlord, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 637, 637-38 n.3 (1984).
For a comprehensive review of landlord-tenant legislation, see Cunningham, The New
Implied and Statautory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract
to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979). The trend is toward incresaing the landlord's
responsibility to provide suitable premises. For example, many states have enacted stat-
utes modeled after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, UNIF. RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 1.102-6.104, 713 U.L.A. 427 (1985), or on other
model codes detailing landlords' duties and tenants' remedies for breach. Cunningham,
supra, at 7.
7. 107 Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
8. Id. at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
9. Id. at 5, 479 N.E.2d at 916.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7, 479 N.E.2d at 917. The Trinkles claimed that problems with the
plumbing caused their toilet to overflow. In addition, sewage leaked through two bed-
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state a cause of action, holding that the Trinkles could not raise the
implied warranty of habitability defense because the city in which they
lived did not have a housing code applicable to rental housing. 12 The
appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that because the city did
not have an applicable building code, no way existed to prove breach of
an implied warranty of habitability.13 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the warranty applies to all leases of resi-
dential real estate, regardless of the existence of a housing or building
code. 14
Traditionally, parties to a lease looked upon the lease as a land con-
veyance, 15 carrying only those guarantees associated with land trans-
fer.16 The tenant took possession of the leased premises subject to the
room ceilings and accumulated in the yard, the bathroom ceiling collapsed, water
leaked through the kitchen ceiling, the furnace and space heater did not work properly,
the front door was difficult to open and close, the back porch was decaying, windows
and doors were improperly sealed, and cockroaches and rodents infested the unit. Id.
Among their affirmative defenses, the Trinkles claimed that, because of an unsafe
furnace, they were constructively evicted. Id. at 6, 479 N.E.2d at 916. The Trinkles
counterclaimed for the difference between the rent actually paid and the unit's fair
rental market value, the cost to replace beds and bedding damaged by the ceiling leaks,
and for higher utility bills resulting from the heating problems. Id. at 7-8, 479 N.E.2d
at 917. The Trinkles further counterclaimed for the difference in rent between the old
and the new premises. Id. at 6, 479 N.E.2d at 916. They alleged that the landlord had
not returned their security deposit, and counterclaimed for that amount, as well as for
indemnificaion for collect telephone calls that the landlord had charged to their phone.
Id. at 8, 479 N.E.2d at 917.
The trial court found that the landlord's failure to fix the furnace had constructively
evicted the Trinkles, and awarded damages. Id. at 8-9, 479 N.E.2d at 917. Glasoe
stipulated to the last affirmative defense and last two counterclaims. Id. at 9, 479
N.E.2d at 918. The trial court deducted the setoffs from the total amount of rent owed
and entered a judgment for the landlord for the balance. Id.
12. Id.
13. Glasoe v. Trinkle, 123 Ill. App. 3d 132, 462 N.E.2d 888 (1984), rev'd, 107 Ill. 2d
1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
14. 107 Il. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918. The court remanded for a determination of
whether the implied warranty of habitability was in fact materially breached. Id. 15,
479 N.E.2d at 921.
15. Because the land was the integral part of the conveyance, any structures thereon
were only incidental to the transfer. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (land was the most important
part of common law leasehold); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973) (at common law, land and not premises was essential part of lease
transaction).
16. The lessor had a duty to deliver the land, but no continuing duty to transfer,
repair, or maintain suitable premises. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§§ 3.37, 3.78 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Lesar, supra note 3, at 1285.
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doctrine of caveat emptor17 and had no recourse against the landlord
for defects either existing in the premises at the lease's inception or that
developed over the course of the tenancy. 8 The first major break with
this tradition occurred in Ingalls v. Hobbs. 9 In Ingalls the tenant
leased a house for the summer.20 At the time the tenant took posses-
sion, the house was infested with bugs. 2 After the tenant refused to
pay rent, the landlord sued.22 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a landlord who rented a furnished house for a summer
impliedly agreed that the house was suitable for immediate occu-
pancy.23 The court stated that in short-term leases of furnished dwell-
ings, the lease is not for the land itself but for the opportunity to enjoy
the premises without delay.24
Despite Ingalls, independent covenant rules of property law, stating
that landlords' and tenants' duties are independent of each other, lim-
ited a tenant's remedy for his or her landlord's failure to provide habit-
able premises.25 The tenant was confined to sue for damages resulting
from the landlord's failure to deliver suitable premises.26 The tenant
could not withhold rent for defective premises.27 To compensate for
these inequalities and to protect parties' expectations, courts in the
17. The tenant takes the premises as he finds them, assuming all risk as to their
fitness. W. WALSH, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 172 (2d ed. 1937).
18. In fact, unless the landlord expressly agreed to keep the premises in repair, the
tenant had the duty to repair. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.78 (A. Casner ed.
1952). A tenant could, therefore, not refuse to pay rent or insist that the landlord repair
the dwelling if substantial defects developed or if the building burned down. Id.
§ 3.103. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809) (lessee liable for full rent after mill
on premises burned down).
19. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
20. Id. at 348, 31 N.E. at 286.
21. Id. at 349, 31 N.E. at 286.
22. Id. at 348, 31 N.E. at 286.
23. Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286-87.
24. Id., 31 N.E. at 286. The court reasoned that a tenant in this circumstance could
not easily determine fitness upon inspection and, therefore, the doctrine of caveat
emptor created an injustice. Id.
25. See 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 1115 (1980).
26. Id. Some courts merely held the lease unenforceable. See, e.g., Brown v.
Southall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) (lease declared invalid because executed
while premises violated housing code).
27. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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1960s and 1970s began applying contract rules to residential leases.28
Under contractual duties, if one party does not perform, the other
party is not obligated to perform.2 9 A landlord's breach of his obliga-
tion to provide fit premises thus alters a tenant's duty to pay rent.30 In
the seminal case of Pines v. Perssion31 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that an implied warranty of habitability exists in every lease and
the landlord breaches that warranty if he does not provide housing fit
for occupation.32 The court concluded that the old rule of caveat
emptor ignored the current need to ensure adequate housing for an in-
creasing population.33 Moreover, Pines applied mutually dependent
covenant rules, holding that the landlord's breach of his covenant to
28. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
29. See, e.g., King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (tenant's
obligation to pay rent dependent on landlord's obligation to provide suitable premises);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470, reh'g denied, 51 Haw. 478 (1969) (ten-
ant's obligation to pay rent dependent on landlord's performance of duty to provide
habitable dwelling); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979) (tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent and landlord's obligation to provide and maintain habitable premises
are mutually dependent promises). See generally Love, Landlord's Liability for Defec-
tive Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 108-
12 (1976) (discusses characterization of lease as contract with mutually dependent
promises between landlord and tenant).
30. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 284, 405 A.2d at 903.
31. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
32. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13. In Pines the lessees (5 students) arranged to
rent a furnished house for the school year. They sued the lessor to recover their depos-
its after finding the house filthy and in violation of numerous building code require-
ments. Id. at 591-93, 111 N.W.2d at 411. The court held that the lessor had breached
the lease's implied warranty of habitability and fitness, concluding that such a warranty
does exist in residential leases. Id. at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412.
33. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. The court referred to a building code and said
the code reflected a legislative intent to impose minimum housing standards. Neverthe-
less, the court based its decision on the general "need and social desirability [for] ade-
quate housing." Id. The Pines court stated that "[p]ermitting landlords to rent
'tumbledown' houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight,
juvenile delinquency, and high property taxes." Id.
But cf. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970) (tenant cannot
withhold rent based on alleged violations of housing code absent express legislative in-
tent to modify common law landlord-tenant relationship with housing code). Although
Posnanski may have overruled Pines sub silentio, courts frequently cite Pines and rarely
mention Posnanski. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973) (citing Pines for proposition that a lease is a contract); Foisy v.
Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (en banc) (Pines abolished doctrine of
caveat emptor).
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provide a habitable house relieved the tenants of liability for rent.34
Nationwide acceptance of the implied warranty of habitability has
grown since Pines.35 The Illinois Supreme Court followed the general
trend in 1972.36 In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little37 two landlords sued
their tenants for nonpayment of rent.38 In defense, the tenants alleged
various defects39 that violated Chicago building code standards.' Of
particular significance was the court's holding that a landlord satisfies
the implied warranty of habitability if the premises substantially com-
ply with the applicable building code.4"
34. Pines, 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
35. State courts, as well as state legislatures, have accepted and applied the war-
ranty. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 5.1 (1977) (landlord breaches an obligation if property leased for residen-
tial purposes is not suitable for use).
Recent decisions have further expanded the implied warranty of habitability to in-
clude situations in which the landlord is strictly liable in tort for injuries to his tenants.
For example, in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 457, 698 P.2d 116, 117, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 213, 214 (1985), the court found the landlord liable for tenant injuries caused by a
defective shower door. The court based liability on the landlord's implied representa-
tion, in renting the unit, of the unit's fitness as a dwelling. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a landlord breached the im-
plied warranty of habitability when, by providing inadequate security, he failed to pre-
vent a criminal assault on a tenant. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 228, 412 A.2d
436, 443 (1980). In Trentacost someone who had entered the high crime neighborhood
apartment building through an unlocked front door assaulted the tenant. Id. at 218,
412 A.2d at 438. See also Brown v. LeClair, 20 Mass. App. 976,482 N.E.2d 870 (1985)
(landlord liable for damages after tenant assaulted by neighbor who punched hole
through front door of apartment; door provided inadequate security).
36. As late as 1964, an appellate court had rejected the doctrine. See Eskin v.
Freedman, 53 Ill. App. 2d 144, 203 N.E.2d 24 (1964) (landlord did not impliedly war-
rant that the rental premises would be safe, healthy, or fit for occupation).
37. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
38. Each landlord brought a forcible entry and detainer action against his tenant
pursuant to the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, 11 1-
22 (1977) (repealed 1982; current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, 9-101 to -321
(1983)). The court consolidated the two cases after each tenant contended that the
obligation to pay full rent depended on the landlord's fulfillment of his obligation to
maintain the premises in a habitable condition. Jack Spring, 50 Ill. 2d at 357, 280
N.E.2d at 212.
39. One defendant also alleged wilful neglect and intentional refusal to repair de-
fects. The other defendant alleged that her landlord had promised, then refused, to
make certain repairs. Id. at 352-54, 280 N.E.2d at 210.
40. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 78-11 to -20 (1957) (current version at CHI-
CAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 78-1 to -72 (1982)).
41. 50 III. 2d at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217. Specifically, the court stated "[w]e hold
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After Jack Spring, lower Illinois courts interpreted "substantial
compliance with the building code" to mean that only tenants leasing
premises subject to building or housing codes can bring an action or
use a defense based on the implied warranty of habitability.42 The Illi-
nois Supreme Court perpetuated this interpretation in Pol Realy Co.
that included in the contracts, both oral and written, governing the tenancies of the
defendants in the multiple unit dwellings occupied by them, is an implied warranty of
habitability which is fulfilled by substantial compliance with the pertinent provisions of
the Chicago building code." Id.
The court relied on Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286
(1960). The court in Schiro stated that all applicable law existing at the time parties
enter into a real estate contract automatically becomes part of the contract. Id. at 544,
165 N.E.2d at 290. The Jack Spring court accordingly held that the Chicago building
code became part of the lease and that the landlord's failure to comply with the code
breached the contract. 50 Ill. 2d at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217. Compare Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (hous-
ing code must be read into all housing contracts). See infra note 42 and accompanying
text.
The author of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Glasoe dissented in Jack Spring,
stating that instead of an implied warranty of habitability, he would impose an implied
covenant to repair. Jack Spring, 50 Ill. 2d at 374, 280 N.E.2d at 221 (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing). See also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
42. E.g., Beese v. National Bank of Albany Park, 82 Ill. App. 3d 932, 934, 403
N.E.2d 595, 579 (1980); Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 649-50, 356 N.E.2d
575, 579 (1976), cert denied, 65 Ill. 2d 577 (1977). See also infra note 53 and accompa-
nying text.
In contrast to the other implied warranty of habitability cases, Beese, Dapkunas, and
Auburn v. Amoco Oil Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 60, 435 N.E.2d 780, cert. denied, 91111. 2d
567 (1982), each involved tenant actions in tort against the landlord for personal injury.
Using the implied warranty of habitability as a sword rather than a shield may have
influenced the decisions of the courts. See generally discussion in Eaton, supra note 4,
at 189-93.
Though agreeing with Beese and Dapkunas, the court in Auburn did not actually
consider the issue of whether or not the leased dwelling must be subject to a building
code before the implied warranty becomes applicable. Auburn, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 62,
435 N.E.2d at 781.
The lower courts' interpretation of Jack Spring is understandable. The court in Jack
Spring relied heavily on, and quoted extensively from, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). In Javins the court
concluded that an existing housing code required it to read a warranty of habitability
into all residential leases that the code covered. See id. at 1080. Thus, even though all
urban leases or housing contracts automatically include the housing code, id. at 1081,
where no housing code exists, there is no way to measure the implied warranty of habit-
ability. Accord Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960)
(contracts for sale of real estate are presumed executed in light of existing law and,
therefore, a building or housing code existing at the time of contracting is deemed part
of the contract).
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v. Sorrells.43
In Pole Realty the landlord sued the tenant for nonpayment of rent
and failure to pay heating bills.' The tenant alleged as an affirmative
defense that the landlord had breached the implied warranty of habita-
bility because the condition of the residence violated the city housing
code.45 The appellate court reversed the trial court's conclusion that
the implied warranty of habitability enunciated in Jack Spring did not
apply to single family residences.46 The Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed this extension of Jack Spring.47 The court reasoned that the
tenant of a single unit dwelling has the same expectations of suitable
housing as the tenant of a multiple unit dwelling.4" In extending Jack
Spring to single unit dwellings,4 9 the court reiterated that the warranty
is fulfilled when the landlord substantially complies with the applicable
building code.5°
Following Pole Realty, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the im-
plied warranty of habitability to new homes without requiring an ex-
isting building code.5" The appellate court in Glasoe v. Trinkle52
43. 84 Il1. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297 (1981).
44. Id. at 179, 417 N.E.2d at 1298.
45. Id. at 180, 417 N.E.2d at 1298-99.
46. Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 78 Ill. App. 3d 361, 366, 397 N.E.2d 539, 542
(1979), affid in part and rev'd in part, 84 Ill. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297 (1981).
47. 84 Ill. 2d at 182, 417 N.E.2d at 1299-1300.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 182, 417 N.E.2d at 1299. Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclu-
sions. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) (implied warranty of habit-
ability applicable to leased single family home).
50. 84 Ill. 2d at 182, 417 N.E.2d at 1299. After Pole Realty, lower Illinois courts
variously applied the scope of the implied warranty of habitability. See infra notes 51-
54 and accompanying text.
The confusion thus engendered was exacerbated by the Illinois appellate court struc-
ture. See Eaton, supra note 4, at 191. Illinois has one intermediate appellate court and
five district courts. Id. Conclusions of one district do not bind other districts, but con-
clusions of any district bind all circuit courts. Id. When district court conclusions
conflict, the circuit court must adhere to the decision of the appellate court in its dis-
trict. Id.
51. In Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979),
the Illinois Supreme Court held that in new home sales, the builder-vendor impliedly
warrants that the house is fit for residential use. Id. at 39-40, 389 N.E.2d at 1157-58.
The court found the house safe, but substantial construction defects made it unfit for its
intended use. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156. Defects included a basement floor slanted
in the wrong direction from the drain, improperly installed siding, and a defective bay
window. Id. The court analogized the implied warranty of habitability to 2-314 (im-
plied warranty of merchantability) and f 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
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refused, however, to extend the warranty in residential leases, empha-
sizing the Pole Realty notion that the rights created in Jack Spring de-
pended upon the existence of a building code.53 Reversing the lower
court's decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in Glasoe54 held that
neither a building nor a housing code is a prerequisite to finding an
implied warranty of habitability.-" The court stated that Jack Spring
referred to a building code only because the leased property happened
to be in a city with an applicable building code.56 The court reasoned
that like tenants living in areas with building or housing codes, tenants
living in areas without building or housing codes expect habitable
premises.57 Because Illinois courts had extended the implied warranty
of habitability to the sale of new homes without depending on building
ular purpose) of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Illinois. Id. at 42, 389
N.E.2d at 1158. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, 2-314, 2-315 (1983).
Cf. Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 463, 433 N.E.2d 651, 656 (1982) (implied warranty
of habitability exists even where builder-vendor has lived in house prior to sale).
52. 123 II. App. 3d 132, 462 N.E.2d 888 (1984), rev'd, 107 Ill. 2d 1,479 N.E.2d 915
(1985).
53. Id. at 135, 462 N.E.2d at 890. The court said that Jack Spring created only a
landlord duty to obey building codes and refused to apply the warranty to all leased real
estate. Id. at 134-35, 402 N.E.2d at 890.
Other Illinois appellate court decisions had previously stressed the necessity of prov-
ing building code violations. See, e.g., Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356
N.E.2d 575 (1976), cert. denied, 65 Ill. 2d 577 (1977) (ruling in Jack Spring applied only
to areas with applicable building codes).
The court further determined that Jack Spring intended only to create a landlord
duty to obey building codes, and not new common law in the landlord-tenant relation-
ship. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 462 N.E.2d at 890. The court concluded that because no
building code existed in the city, the Trinkles' lease did not contain an implied warranty
of habitability. Id. at 136, 462 N.E.2d at 891.
54. 107 Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 1985).
55. Id. at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918. Justice Ryan authored the majority opinion. His
authorship is significant because he previously did not consider the implied warranty of
habitability to exist in areas without building or housing codes. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. His ultimate acceptance of the implied warranty of habitability is
indicative of the Illinois courts increasing acceptance of the warranty.
56. Id. at 11, 479 N.E.2d at 918-19.
57. Id. at 11, 479 N.E.2d at 919. The court also relied on Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa.
272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that breach of
the implied warranty of habitability does not depend on proof of a housing code viola-
tion. The Pugh court stated that such a requirement would unnecessarily restrict the
situations in which courts could find such breach. Id. at 290, 405 A.2d at 906.
The court in Pugh also refused to accept the landlord's argument that because a
Pennsylvania rent withholding statute showed a legislative intent to improve tenants'
remedies, courts should not develop more common law standards. Id. at 285, 405 A.2d
at 903.
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or housing codes, the court found it "illogical and inconsistent" to re-
quire a building or housing code for rental housing. 8
The court further stated that the legislature should establish mini-
mum habitability standards,59 but because this had not been done, the
court provided some guidelines for determining habitability."0 The
court also enumerated factors relevant in determining breach of the
implied warranty of habitability.61 These factors include the nature of
the defect, its effect on habitability and amount of time it persisted, the
age and location of the building, the amount of rent paid, and whether
the tenant waived the defect or caused it through abnormal or unusual
use.62 The court stressed that the defects must be substantial enough
to make the premises uninhabitable to a person with reasonable
sensitivities.63
58. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 11, 479 N.E.2d at 919. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendants-Appellants Jerry Trinkle and Diane Trinkle at 9, Glasoe v. Trin-
kle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 1985). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. 107 Ill. 2d at 12, 479 N.E.2d at 919. One month before the appellate court
decision in Glasoe, Representatives Johnson and Breslin introduced the Illinois Residen-
tial Owner and Resident Act to the Illinois General Assembly. H. 0695, 84th Gen.
Assembly (Ill. 1985-86) [hereinafter the Act]. The Act prescribes both owner and resi-
dent rights and duties under a dwelling unit rental agreement. Id. at 1. Section 2.104
provides that the owner must maintain the premises in a habitable condition at all
times, and lists minimum standards of habitability. Id. at 17. Section 4.101 provides
for tenant remedies when the owner does not comply with the Act's requirements. Id.
at 27. This bill was tabled one month before the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Glasoe. Telephone interview with Mary Holmes, Supervisor of Journal Room, House of
Representatives Clerk's Office, State of Illinois (Sept. 6, 1985).
Two comparable bills, the Tenants Bill of Rights Act and "an act which provides for
lessees when lessors fail to maintain premises suitable for habitation," were on interim
study. H. 0329, H. 2227, 84th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 1985-86). Telephone interview with
Mary Holmes, Supervisor of Journal Room, House of Representatives Clerk's Office,
State of Illinois (Sept. 6, 1985).
60. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 13-14, 479 N.E.2d at 919-20. See also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
61. 107 Ill. 2d at 14, 479 N.E.2d at 920.
62. Id. The court relied on and cited factors enunciated by other courts. E.g.,
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 93, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
63. 107 Ill. 2d at 14, 479 N.E.2d at 920. Accord Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974) (landlord need not ensure that the prem-
ises are perfect and aesthetically pleasing).
The court then suggested the following ways for computing damages: (a) the "per-
centage reduction in use" approach reduces the tenant's rent by a percentage reflecting
the diminution in value and enjoyment of the premises resulting from the defects, 107
Ill. 2d at 15-16, 479 N.E.2d at 921; (b) the "difference in value" approach measures
damages by (1) the difference between the fair rental value of the premises as warranted
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Although the Glasoe court professed to not establish rigid minimum
habitability standards, it clearly laid the foundation for such standards
by listing factors that lower courts should consider to determine
whether a landlord has breached the implied warranty of habitability.6'
The Illinois Supreme Court falls into line with other jurisdictions that
have expanded tenants' rights and established minimum standards of
habitability in the absence of effective legislation.65 Glasoe indicates a
judicial concern for extending the same protections to tenants living in
areas without building or housing codes as those living in areas with
such codes.66 Most tenants probably do not know whether a building
or housing code exists in their city and those who are aware of such
codes may not be familiar with the required minimum standards.
Because the Glasoe court did not formulate a more specific test, how-
ever, problems will occur as lower courts attempt to establish the war-
ranty's contours and apply them on a case-by-case basis.6 7 A
particularly problematic situation will confront both landlords and ten-
ants in areas without building or housing codes. Because living stan-
and the fair rental value of the premises during occupancy in the unfit condition, or
(2) the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value of the premises dur-
ing occupancy in the unfit condition. Id.
The court stated the agreed rent may indicate fair rental value and recommended on
remand, if the trial court finds a breach of the implied warranty, that it use the differ-
ence in value approach. Id. at 17, 479 N.E.2d at 921-22. Accord Hilder v. St. Peter, 144
Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984) (court may look to agreed rent as evidence of fair rental
value of premises as warranted).
See generally Fusco, Collins & Birnbaum, Damages for Breach of the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability in Illinois--A Realistic Approach, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 337
(1979) (discusses different damage formulas and recommends "loss of use to tenant"
theory, in which damages reflect tenant's loss of use and enjoyment of leased premises
due to defective conditions causing lessened habitability).
64. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
65. Recent bills introduced in the Illinois legislature failed to obtain enough legisla-
tive support to become law. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Why no further legislative action has occurred on these bills is unclear. One author
suggests that lack of legislative action may indicate a legislative and judicial belief that
changing the law on the books will have little effect on the landlord-tenant relationships.
Cunningham, supra note 6, at 153. See also Eaton, supra note 4, at 207 (land-owning
legislators do not support landlord-tenant reform; landlords are well represented by
powerful lobbying groups).
66. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
67. Additionally, each district court must establish its own specific standards, which
may or may not conflict with standards established by other district courts, and the
circuit courts below will need to harmonize all district court decisions. See also supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
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dards and tenant expectations vary, tenants will not know how to
determine whether the premises are habitable. Nor will landlords
know exactly when a rental unit's condition is below standard. As a
result, landlords found to have breached the implied warranty of habit-
ability may claim lack of due process or notice. Additionally, tenants
still will not know when they are justified in withholding or deducting
rent because of defective conditions in the rental premises.
The implications of Glasoe are uncertain. The next logical step is for
Illinois courts to expand residential landlord-tenant law and find land-
lords liable for personal injuries to the tenant attributable to defective
premises" or criminal activity of third persons. 69 The view that the
implied warranty of habitability provides no basis for tort liability is
inconsistent with the policies that led to the warranty's creation. 0 Illi-
nois courts are thus likely to expand the situations in which residential
landlords are liable for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
Glasoe is consistent with the national trend of creating and enforcing
tenants' rights.71 The court recognized a tenant's expectations and
rights to safe and sanitary housing and established a rule implying the
warranty of habitability in all residential leases. The decision not to
articulate precise minimum standards, however, creates more uncer-
tainty for the lower courts, as well as for landlords and tenants. The
failure to set minimum standards might, in fact, undermine an other-
wise potentially effective tenant remedy for inadequate housing.
Anita D. Raddatz
68. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
69. Id.
70. See Mallor, supra note 6, at 650-51.
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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